The logic LAE q discussed in this paper is based on an approximate entailment relation. LAE q generalises classical propositional logic to the effect that conclusions can be drawn with a quantified imprecision. To this end, properties are modelled by subsets of a distance space and statements are of the form that one property implies another property within a certain limit of tolerance. We adopt the conceptual framework defined by E. Ruspini; our work is towards a contribution to the investigation of suitable logical calculi.
Introduction
Reasoning about a particular topic means exploiting the logical relationships between potential facts. For instance, if we know that some property α applies and that α implies another property β, we draw the conclusion that then also β applies. Under practical circumstances, however, reasoning is often done in a somewhat flexible way. In fact, we typically draw the indicated conclusion even if the presence of α does not imply β strictly. Knowing that whenever α holds we are in a situation close to a situation in which β holds is often considered as a sufficient basis for an inference. Reasoning in such a way might be called "approximate" and its formalisation is the topic of the present paper.
Approximate reasoning can be realised in many different ways. For an overview of the many different approaches to this field, see, e.g., [HAH] . Here, we adopt the conceptual framework that has been specified by E. Ruspini in his seminal paper [Rus] in 1991.
Let us outline the main ideas. Assume that we are given a set of properties, suitable to describe some objects under consideration. Let a universe of discourse W , customarily called a set of worlds, be chosen, corresponding to the different possible states in which the objects can be. We may then assume that at each world w an evaluation assigns to each property ϕ its truth value "true" or "false". Likewise, with each property ϕ we may associate the subset of W consisting of those worlds at which ϕ holds. In this framework, the canonical way of reasoning obeys the rules of classical propositional logic (CPL). In particular, implicational relationships correspond to subsethood: for two properties α and β to validate α → β means that the set A ⊆ W associated with α is contained in the set B ⊆ W associated with β.
Practical reasoning, however, should be robust with regard to small changes. To allow for greater flexibility, Ruspini takes into account an additional aspect. The set of worlds describes the variety of states of the objects under consideration and there might be a natural way to specify the degree to which two such states resemble. A similarity relation on W can be introduced for this purpose, mapping each pair of worlds v, w ∈ W to an element s(v, w) of the real unit interval, a larger value meaning a stronger resemblance. Such a mapping can be understood as a graded version of an accessibility relation in the sense of modal logic. In fact, for any given r ∈ [0, 1], we may define the binary relation R r on W requiring v R r w if s(v, w) r. Based on R r , we may define a possibility operator ♦ r on the power set of W . The expression α → ♦ r β then generalises the classical implication. At a world w at which α is fulfilled, β might not hold but still be regarded as an "example" of β. However, w will be a "typical example" only if r = 1. For r close to 1, w might still be considered as a "good example", but for small r, the world w would be considered as a "bad example".
Ruspini's approach has been explored from a logical perspective in a series of pa-pers by numerous authors. A comprehensive study is the paper [EGGR] . The paper [DPEGG] is a further early contribution and includes an application to interpolative reasoning as required in rule-based fuzzy control. For a more recent article, which contains an overview of different approaches, see [GoRo] .
A logical calculus may also be based on a graded analogue of the classical implication, without the detour via modal operators. In fact, Ruspini defines the degree of implication between properties α and β modelled by subsets A and B, respectively, by I(B|A) = inf v∈A sup w∈B s(v, w).
We may hence define that α implies β to the degree r if I(B|A) r. This idea is exploited in the Ph.D. Thesis of R. Rodríguez [Rod] and is moreover the basis of the paper [EGRV] .
The logic LAE q that we consider in this paper is conceptually in line with these last mentioned papers. Details differ, but our modifications do not affect the overall picture. Our syntactical objects are of the form
where α and β are formulas of CPL and d is a positive real number (possibly 0). The two CPL formulas are interpreted by subsets of a quasimetric space. A quasimetric is defined similarly to a metric, but the axiom of symmetry is dropped. The statement (1) is defined to be satisfied if the set of worlds associated with α is contained in the d-neighbourhood of the set associated with β. We note that we work with a quasimetric and not with the dual notion of a quasisimilarity. For this reason the values associated with formulas are interpreted in the reverse way: the statement α d → β is the weaker, the larger the parameter d is. In particular, α 0 → β holds whenever α → β is a tautology of CPL.
LAE
q could be regarded as a logic of quasimetric spaces. A different perspective on logics of metric spaces as well as logics of more general distance spaces has been developed in a further series of papers. In [KSSWZ] , first-order logic on universes endowed with a distance function is studied. Related contributions include [SSWZ] , [Kut] , and [STWZ] .
We may furthermore ask for the connections of our work to many-valued logic. We deal with implications between crisp properties, endowed with real values that express the degree to which the implicational relationships hold. The notion of a Graded Consequence Relation between sets of Boolean formulas and a further Boolean formula has been introduced by Chakraborty [Cha, ChDu] . A central aim has been the adaptation of common logical concepts to a many-valued framework.
In spite of the distinct scopes, Chakraborty's notion shares conceptually certain aspects with our framework: crisp properties are dealt with on the base level, a degree is added on the metalevel. An exact relationship has been established, however, only in a more general context. Namely, Graded Consequence Relations were generalised to hold between a fuzzy subset of formulas and a further formula; see, e.g., [DuCh, REGG] . In [REGG] , it is pointed out that Implicative Closure Operators capture the approximate entailment relation on which the present work is based.
The present work follows up the previous papers [Rod, GoRo, EGRV] . To see in which respect our work represents a progress, let us go further into detail. The present approach differs in two important points from [EGRV] . Firstly, the logic discussed in [EGRV] is not based on a quasimetric but on a similarity relation. The relationship between a quasimetric and a similarity relation is an indirect one: a metric is a symmetric quasimetric and a similarity relation can be regarded as a generalisation of a metric. Secondly, in [EGRV] , the language is required to consist of a fixed finite number of variables and each world is assumed to correspond to what is called a maximal elementary conjunction, or m.e.c. for short. A m.e.c. is a conjunction of literals in which all variables occur exactly once. Here, m.e.c.s are not used.
The latter aspect has in fact been the starting point for the present work: we no longer assume that the number of variables is bound by a fixed finite number. This change implies that we can not proceed in the same way as, e.g., in [EGRV] . The axiomatisation of the logic cannot be done in the same style as before and the methods employed in completeness proofs are no longer available, as there is no counterpart of a m.e.c. here. In the proof system proposed in [EGRV] , there are two axioms that rely on m.e.c.s. The first one expresses the symmetry of the distance function; it corresponds to the requirement that if a world is in the d-neighbourhood of another world, also the converse relation holds. A further axiom is concerned with disjunctions; it corresponds to the fact that if a world is in the neighbourhood of the union of two sets, then it is already in the neighbourhood of one of them.
A previous work whose aim has been to replace these two axioms is our contribution [Vet] . In this case, we introduced an additional binary connective . For two subsets A and B of a metric space, A B was supposed to contain all those elements whose distance to A is at most as large as their distance to B. The same connective has also been considered in the framework of Logics of Comparative Similarity; see, e.g., [AOS] . The presence of enabled us to overcome the problem of characterising the neighbourhood of the union of sets. The problem of characterising the symmetry of the distance function was not touched; symmetry was not assumed.
Here, we do not extend the language by additional connectives. Instead, we pose a seemingly natural question: Do we really need the axioms involving m.e.c.s for the axiomatisation of a logic of approximate entailment? Could it be the case that the remaining axioms are already sufficient?
We contribute a step towards an affirmation of the latter question. In fact, using quasimetrics as distance functions, we provide a positive answer. For the associated approximate entailment relation, we present a proof calculus that is restricted to the obviously necessary minimum of rules; nonetheless, we establish its soundness and completeness. We again have to include a finiteness condition though; we show the completeness of our calculus w.r.t. finite theories.
We proceed as follows. In the introductory Section 2, we specify the logic LAE q , which deals with graded implications of the form (1) and interprets properties by subsets of a quasimetric space. Section 3 introduces the calculus LAE, based on a small set of rules that are sound for LAE q . We furthermore establish that proofs in LAE can be represented in the form of weighted directed forests, which are directed graphs whose components are directed trees. In Section 4, we present a representation theorem for quasimetric Boolean algebras. Section 5 then establishes our final result, according to which provability in LAE coincides with the entailment relation of LAE q . Some concluding remarks are contained in Section 6.
The Logic of Approximate Entailment in Quasimetric Spaces
We are concerned in this paper with a logic of approximate entailment; our work may be seen as a continuation of the contributions [Rod, GoRo, EGRV] to this topic. The logics that have been considered under this name often differ in details. Here, our intention is to define and axiomatise a logic in close accordance with the original concepts of Ruspini, presented in his well-known paper [Rus] .
Let us specify the semantic framework. The symbolR + will denote the extended positive real line, that is,R + = R + ∪ {∞} = {r ∈ R : r 0} ∪ {∞}. Here, ∞ is a new element such that r < ∞ for any r ∈ R + . We extend the addition from R + toR + requiring r + ∞ = ∞ + r = ∞ for any r ∈R + . The operations of minimum and maximum onR + will be denoted by ∧ and ∨, respectively.
Definition 2.1. Let W be a non-empty set. A quasimetric on W is a mapping q : W × W →R + such that for any v, w, x ∈ W :
(M1) q(v, w) = 0 if and only if v = w;
In this case, we call (W, q) a quasimetric space.
In a quasimetric space (W, q), the distance of some a ∈ W from some B ⊆ W is defined to be q(a, B) = inf b∈B q(a, b).
Moreover, for d ∈R + , we define the set
Note that we use the same symbol for the quasimetric, the distance of a point from a set, and the Hausdorff quasidistance.
A quasimetric space (W, q) is called a min-space if, for any a ∈ W and B ⊆ W , there is a b ∈ B such that q(a, B) = q(a, b). This notion is due to [SSWZ] , where the importance of min-spaces in a logical setting has been pointed out.
Let us compile a few immediate observations. Lemma 2.2. Let (W, q) be a quasimetric space, let a ∈ W , A, B ⊆ W , and
is a min-space, also the converse holds.
(ii) q(a, B) d if and only if a ∈ U d (B).
Moreover, the following properties are characteristic for the Hausdorff quasidistance.
Lemma 2.3. Let (W, q) be a quasimetric space and let A, B, C ⊆ W .
Proof. We only show (v). We calculate
We next specify the logic LAE q . The language of LAE q includes a countably infinite number of variables, denoted by small Greek letters, as well as the two constants ⊥ (false), and (true). By a Boolean formula, we mean a formula built up from the variables and the constants by means of the binary operations ∧ (and), and ∨ (or), as well the unary operation ¬ (not). The connective → (implies), is defined as usual.
Moreover, a graded implication, or an implication for short, is a triple consisting of two Boolean formulas α and β as well as a number d ∈ R + . We write α d → β and we call d the degree of the implication.
A model for LAE q is a Boolean algebra (B; ∩, ∪, , ∅, W ) of subsets of a quasimetric space (W, q) such that for each A ∈ B and
Given a model B, an evaluation is a mapping v from the Boolean formulas to B in the sense of classical propositional logic. That is, we require
A theory is a set of implications. We say that a theory T semantically entails some implication Φ in LAE q if, whenever all elements of T are satisfied by an evaluation v, also Φ is satisfied by v.
Having specified the logic LAE q in formal respects, let us now explain its intended meaning. First of all, we deal with Boolean formulas, interpreted by subsets of a fixed set of worlds. The Boolean formulas hence refer to crisp properties.
Furthermore, the role of the quasimetric is analogous to the role of the similarity relation in Ruspini's framework. A major difference is, however, that we do not assume symmetry here. Substituting the similarity relation by a quasimetric moreover means that the order is understood in the opposite way. Let q be a quasimetric on a set of worlds W . Then, for two worlds v and w, q(v, w) = 0 means coincidence, that is, v = w. Moreover, the larger q(v, w) is, the less the worlds v and w resemble each other. Finally, q(v, w) = ∞ means that v and w are considered as unrelated.
The use of the dual order has practical reasons; the proofs will be easier to follow. A further advantage is that we are in line with the common topological terminology. We note that, however, a quasimetric can be identified with a quasisimilarity based on the product t-norm. Here, we understand a quasisimilarity similarly to a similarity relation [Rus] , but without assuming symmetry. It is straightforward to
the two concepts coincide.
Let us finally recall the meaning of an expression of the form α d → β. This implication to be satisfied means that any world at which α holds is in the d-neighbourhood of the set of worlds at with β holds. Conversely, if the implication is not satisfied, then there is a world w with the following property: α holds at w, and for all worlds v at which β holds, we have q(w, v) > d. We conclude that the degree d of the implication is a degree of imprecision: we may read α d → β as "α implies β within the limit of tolerance d".
The calculus LAE
The purpose of this paper is to define a proof system for LAE q . To this end we introduce a calculus denoted by LAE.
Recall that the syntactical objects of LAE q are graded implications and that we do not allow to build compound formulas from statements of the form (1) by means of the classical connectives. Exactly this possibility is admitted in [EGRV] , where a two-level language is used. Accordingly, the calculus of [EGRV] is based on axioms together with the modus ponens as the only rule.
Our calculus LAE will instead be based on rules, suitable to derive implications from implications; there are no connectives on the metalevel. The style of LAE might be considered as somewhat similar to Skolem's calculus for lattice theory; see, e.g., [NePl] . We are, in addition, inspired by the proof-theoretic methods in fuzzy logics [MOG] ; a remote resemblance with the sequent systems used in substructural logic might thus be observable as well.
We assume from now on that the set of variables is fixed and that from these variables, all Boolean formulas and implications are built up.
A rule of LAE consists of a possibly empty set of implications, called the assumptions, and one further implication, called the conclusion. We denote a rule writing the assumptions, if there are any, above the conclusion, using a separating horizontal line.
Definition 3.1. LAE consists of the following rules, where α, β, γ are any Boolean formulas and c, d ∈ R + :
→ γ Let T be a theory and Φ be an implication. A proof of Φ from T in LAE is defined in the usual way. We write T Φ if such a proof exists.
Comparing LAE with the axiom system of [EGRV, Def. 4 .2], we may say that, roughly, LAE incorporates the same axioms except for those involving m.e.c.s, which are not available in the present context.
Our aim is to show the completeness of LAE with regard to the consequence relation of LAE q , that is, semantic entailment in LAE q coincides with provability in LAE. The soundness part does not cause difficulties.
Proposition 3.2. Let T be a theory and Φ an implication. If T proves Φ in LAE, then T semantically entails Φ in LAE q .
Proof. If the assumptions of a rule are satisfied by an evaluation v, the conclusion is satisfied by v as well. This is clear for (R1)-(R5). In case of (R6), it follows from Lemma 2.2(v).
In spite of the seeming simplicity of the calculus LAE, the proof of the converse of Proposition 3.2, given in Section 5, is not trivial. In the remainder of the present section, we will define a certain way of representing proofs of LAE.
We will call two Boolean formulas α and β Boolean equivalent, in signs α ≈ β, if α → β and β → α are tautologies of CPL. Assume α ≈ α and β ≈ β ; then the implications α In the sequel, we will consider Boolean formulas up to Boolean equivalence. Boolean formulas will in fact be dealt with in disjunctive normal form. Definition 3.3. A Boolean formula of the form ϕ or ¬ϕ, where ϕ is a variable, will be called a literal. By a clause, we mean a finite set of literals, and by a clause set, we mean a finite set of clauses. A clause L is called inconsistent if there is a variable ϕ such that L contains both ϕ and ¬ϕ, and consistent otherwise.
With a clause set
where l 0 and k 1 , . . . , k l 0, we associate the Boolean formula
and denote it by f (B). Here, an empty conjunction stands for and an empty disjunction stands for ⊥.
We note that, in this paper, clause sets represent disjunctive normal forms. That is, we interpret clauses conjunctively and sets of clauses disjunctively.
Clearly, each Boolean formula α is Boolean equivalent to a formula associated with a clause set. In particular, ⊥ is, e.g., associated with the empty set {}; and is, e.g., associated with the clause set consisting of a single empty clause, {{}}. We will call a clause set B such that α ≈ f (B) a clause set for α.
An implication of the following form is called basic:
here, n 1, l 0, and k 1 , . . . , k l 1; moreover, {λ 1 , . . . , λ n } and {µ i1 , . . . , µ ik i }, i = 1, . . . , l, are consistent clauses. In particular, we may identify a basic implication with a triple consisting of a clause, a clause set, and a positive real.
A theory T consisting of basic implications will also be called basic. By the following lemma, we may restrict our considerations to basic theories.
Lemma 3.4. Let T be a theory. Then there is a basic theory T b such that any implication is provable from T if and only if it is provable from T b .
Proof. Let us modify T as follows. Let α
→ β is derivable in LAE q by (R1) and (R3). In this case, we drop it from T . W.l.o.g., we can otherwise assume that the implication is of the form
where l 1 and l 0 and, for all i, {ν i1 , . . . , ν ik i }, {µ i1 , . . . , ν ik i } are non-empty consistent clauses. We drop in this case α d → β from T and add instead the basic implications
where i = 1, . . . , l . By repeated application of (R5), we can derive α d → β from the implications (4). Conversely, by (R1) and (R6), we can derive the implication (4) for each i from α
Proceeding in the same way for each element of T , we obtain a theory T b that consists of basic implications only.
In the sequel, we will identify proofs of LAE with certain weighted directed graphs labelled by Boolean formulas. We will adopt the common terminology to denote the relationship between nodes, like child, father, sibling, and descendant. Moreover, a directed forest is a directed graph such that each component is a directed tree; the latter's designated elements are called roots then. The nodes without child are called terminal nodes or leaves. A subtree as well as the subtree rooted at some node is understood in the obvious way. A branch is a maximal subtree with the property that each non-terminal node has exactly one child.
A weighted directed forest is a directed forest together with a map assigning to each edge a positive real number, called its weight. Finally, all graphs with which we deal will be labelled. However, to facilitate formulations, the mapping associating labels to nodes will be kept implicit; we will simply identify the nodes with their labels.
Definition 3.5. A proof forest is a finite weighted directed forest each of whose nodes is either a clause or the symbol .
A node of a proof forest distinct from is called proper. The length of a branch is defined to be 0 if it contains and else as the sum of the weights of its edges. By the length of a proof forest, we mean the maximum of the lengths of its branches.
Let T be a basic theory and let ζ r → η be an implication. Then a proof forest is called a forest proof of ζ r → η from T if the following conditions hold: (T1) There is a clause set B ζ for ζ such that, for each clause L in B ζ , there is a root that is a subset of L.
(T2) There is a clause set B η for η such that, for any terminal clause L, there is a clause in B η that is a subset of L.
(T3) The length of the proof forest is at most r.
(T4) Let L be a non-terminal clause. Then the weights of all edges rooted at L coincide; let c be this value. One of the following possibilities applies:
(A) c = 0 and T contains a basic implication of the form (3), where
(B) c > 0 and T contains a basic implication of the form (3), where d = c, {λ 1 , . . . , λ n } ⊆ L, and for each i = 1, . . . , l, a clause L ⊆ {µ i1 , . . . , µ ik i } is a child of L.
(C) c = 0, L is inconsistent, and is the only child of L.
(D) c = 0, and for some variable ϕ, called the splitting variable in the sequel, L has exactly two children, one of which is a clause consisting of ϕ and a subset of L and one of which is a clause consisting of ¬ϕ and a subset of L.
For illustration, let us include an example. Figure 1 shows a forest proof of the implication
from the theory
The block used for α ∧ β is {{α, β}}; the block for (¬δ ∧ ε) ∨ (δ ∧ ¬ε) is {{¬δ, ε}, {δ, ¬ε}}. Note that the length of the two branches not terminating with is 0.3; hence the length of the forest proof is 0.3. We observe furthermore that all four cases of condition (T4) occur. For instance, at the root {α, β}, case (A) of (T4) applies; at its child {β, γ}, case (B) applies; at the root's child {β, ¬β}, case (C) applies; and at the node {δ}, case (D) applies. The rest of this section is devoted to the aim of showing that provability in LAE is equivalent to the existence of proof forests.
We next show the first out of several technical lemmas, according to which a forest proof may be assumed to fulfil certain additional conditions.
Improper nodes are labelled by and this symbol represents falsity. By the following lemma we can assume that the improper nodes are all terminal.
Lemma 3.6. Let there be a forest proof of ζ r → η from a basic theory T . Then there is a forest proof of ζ r → η from T such that (i) any node is terminal and (ii) a node does not have siblings.
Proof. Consider a non-terminal node . We remove all children of together with the subtrees rooted at them. Then the length of the proof forest is smaller than before. Moreover, each terminal node of the modified proof is a terminal node of the original proof; hence condition (T2) is still fulfilled. We conclude that the result is a forest proof of ζ r → η from T . Applying the same procedure in all applicable cases, the first part follows.
Next, consider a clause L that has a child as well as further children. Then case (A) or (B) applies. Obviously, we can remove the subtree rooted at the child . Arguing as before, the second part follows as well. Proof. By Lemma 3.6, we can assume that every node is terminal and does not possess siblings.
Let B ζ be a clause set for ζ according to (T1). If B ζ is empty, we have ζ ≈ ⊥ and the assertion is clear from (R1) and (R3). Note that in this case the proof forest is arbitrary. For the rest of the proof, we assume that B ζ is non-empty.
LetL be any clause contained in B ζ and let us consider the tree whose root is a subset ofL. Our aim is to show T L r → η. As ζ is Boolean equivalent to the disjunction of all conjunctions of a clause in B ζ , the assertion will then follow by (R1) and (R5). We claim: ( ) Let L be a proper node. Let S be the subtree rooted at L and let e be the length of S. Then L (b) Let L be a non-terminal clause and let be its only child. We claim that then
→ ⊥ for some L ⊆ L and c ∈ R + ; by (R1) and (R4), the implication in question is derivable. In case (C), L ≈ ⊥, and we draw the same conclusion. Case (D) cannot apply. Proof. Let ϕ be a variable and let L be a clause containing ϕ and ¬ϕ. If L is non-terminal, we remove each child of L together with the subtree rooted at it. Afterwards, we add as the only child of L and we endow the edge from L to with the weight 0.
Then case (C) of condition (T4) applies at L. Furthermore, we readily check that the modified forest proof is still a forest proof of ζ r → η from T . Proof. By (T4), cases (A) or (B), each implication contained in T possesses a forest proof.
We will now check for each of the rules (R1)-(R6) that whenever each assumption possesses a forest proof, so does the conclusion. The assertion will then follow by induction over the length of a proof in LAE.
Ad (R1). Let α → β be a tautology of CPL. Then there is a clause set B α = {L 1 , . . . , L n } for α and a clause set B β for β such that, for each i, L i is a subset of a clause in B β . Then the forest that consists of the single node if B α is empty, and of the isolated nodes L i otherwise is a forest proof of α 0 → β.
Ad (R2). Assume that there is a forest proof of α 0 → β. Let γ be any Boolean formula; then there is also a forest proof of α ∧ γ 0 → β ∧ γ, as follows from the following two observations. First, let λ be a literal; we construct a forest proof of α ∧ λ 0 → β ∧ λ as follows. If α ≈ ⊥, the forest proof consisting of the node alone fulfils the requirement. Otherwise, we add λ to the (proper) roots; and for all proper nodes L based on case (A) or (D), we recursively add λ to the proper children of L if λ was added to L. The result fulfils the requirements; for, if a node L is based on case (B) or (C), all branches through L end up with .
Second, assume that, for Boolean formulas γ 1 and γ 2 , there are forest proofs of α ∧ γ 1 0 → β ∧ γ 1 as well as α ∧ γ 2 0 → β ∧ γ 2 . Joining both these proofs, we get a forest proof of Assume second that β is not Boolean equivalent to ⊥. Let L be a proper leaf of the first proof. Then we can enlarge the proof forest by applications of (T4)(D) to L such that each new leaf L includes a rootL of the second proof. We then connect all children ofL, together with the subtrees rooted at them, to L . Proceeding in the same way for all proper leafs of the first proof, we obtain a forest proof of α c+d → γ.
Ad (R3). In view of (T3), a forest proof of α
We summarise that LAE proves an implication ζ r → η from a theory T exactly if there exists a forest proof of ζ r → η from T .
Quasimetric Boolean algebras
The propositions of our logic are interpreted by subsets of a quasimetric space. Moreover, the degree to which an implication is defined to hold is determined by the Hausdorff quasidistance, which assigns to any two elements of this algebra a positive real.
In this context we are led to the following notion. Recall that a Boolean algebra B is called separable if B is generated by a countable subset. We note that the present notion should not be confused with the notion of a metric Boolean algebra, which is usually meant to be a Boolean algebra together with a measure on it.
The aim of this section is to establish a representation theorem for quasimetric Boolean algebras. The Boolean algebra B will be represented by a set of subsets of a set W and the quasimetric p on B by the Hausdorff quasidistance induced by a quasimetric on W .
We will need in the sequel Stone's representation theorem of Boolean algebras [Sik] . Recall that a subset F of a Boolean algebra B is called a prime filter if (i) a ∈ F and a b imply b ∈ F , (ii) a ∧ b ∈ F for any a, b ∈ F , and (iii) for each a ∈ B, exactly one of a and ¬ a is in F . Theorem 4.2. Let (B; ∧, ∨, ¬, 0, 1) be a Boolean algebra. Then there is a compact topological space W such that B is isomorphic with (C; ∩, ∪, , ∅, W ), where C is the set of clopen subsets of W .
Proof (sketched). Let W be the set of prime filters of B. Define ι : B → P(W ), a → {F ∈ W : a ∈ F }. Then ι is an injective homomorphism from B to P(W ), endowed with the set-theoretical operations.
Let furthermore W be endowed with the coarsest topology whose open sets include ι(a) for all a ∈ B. Then the image of B is the set of clopen subsets of W . Hence ι induces an isomorphism as claimed.
Our representation theorem will not apply for quasimetric Boolean algebras in general; we will assume two further properties.
Theorem 4.3. Let (B, p) be a quasimetric Boolean algebra such that the following additional conditions are fulfilled.
Then there exists a quasimetric space (W, q) and an injective Boolean homomorphism ι from B to the algebra of subsets of W such that
for all A, B ∈ B.
Proof. Let W be the compact topological space consisting of the prime filters of B, such that B can be identified with the set of clopen sets endowed with the settheoretical operations. Note that, by construction, each sequence A 0 ⊇ A 1 ⊇ . . . of elements of B has a non-empty intersection; and conversely, as B is separable, there is for each w ∈ W a sequence
For a ∈ W and B ∈ B, we put
and for a, b ∈ W , we put
In the rest of the proof, we will omit the explicit reference to B; capital Latin letters will always vary over elements of B. Our first aim is to show that q : W ×W →R + is a quasimetric.
To see (M1), let a, b ∈ W such that q(a, b) = 0. Let B be such that b ∈ B. Then inf a∈A p(A, B) = 0. Hence there is a sequence A 0 ⊇ A 1 ⊇ . . . such that a ∈ A i for all i and inf i p(A i , B) = 0. We conclude from (QB6) that p(A j , B) = 0 for some j; from (QB1) that A j ⊆ B; and hence a ∈ B. As B is an arbitrary set containing b, it follows a = b.
To see (M2), let a, b, c ∈ W . We calculate 
holds for any A, B ∈ B. To this end, we first prove some auxiliary facts.
(a) Let a ∈ W and B, C ∈ B. Then q(a, B ∪ C) = q(a, B) ∧ q(a, C).
By (QB3), q(a, B ∪ C) q(a, B) ∧ q(a, C). Let ε > 0 and choose some A such that a ∈ A and q(a, B ∪C) q(A, B ∪C) q(a, B ∪C)+ε. By (QB5), there are A , A such that A = A ∪ A and q(A , B) ∨ q(A , C) = q(A, B ∪ C). If a ∈ A , we have q(a, B) q(A , B) q(A, B∪C) q(a, B∪C)+ε. Taking into account the possibility a ∈ A as well, we conclude q(a, B) ∧ q(a, C) q(a, B ∪ C) + ε. As ε is arbitrary, (a) follows.
(b) Let a ∈ W and B ∈ B. Then q(a, B) = inf b∈B q(a, b).
Clearly, q(a, B) q(a, b) for any b ∈ B. Assume that c q(a, b) for any b ∈ B. Let ε > 0. For each b ∈ B, we have q(a, b) = sup b∈C q(a, C) = sup b∈C, C⊆B q(a, C) and hence we may choose a C b ⊆ B containing b such that c q(a, C b ) + ε. By compactness, there are finitely many elements
As ε is arbitrary, c q(a, B), and (b) follows.
(c) Let A, B ∈ B. Then there is anā ∈ A such that p(A, B) = q(ā, B).
By the separability of B and by (QB2), there is a sequence
We finally turn to the proof of (7). Let A, B ∈ B. By (c), there is anā ∈ A such that p(A, B) = q(ā, B); consequently, p(A, B) = max a∈A q(a, B). By (b), we have q(a, B) = inf b∈B q(a, b) for each a ∈ A. The assertion follows.
A completeness theorem for LAE q
This section contains the main result of the paper: we show that the calculus LAE is complete with respect to the entailment relation of LAE q .
The proof of the completeness theorem will rely on the notion of a proof forest, defined in Section 3, as well as on the representation of quasimetric Boolean algebras, contained in Section 4. In addition, we will need a couple of auxiliary results on proof forests (Lemma 5.1-5.8).
Lemma 5.1. Let T be a finite theory and let ζ, η be Boolean formulas such that T ζ s → η for some s ∈ R + . Then there is an r ∈ R + with the following properties: (i) r is the smallest value such that T ζ r → η and (ii) r is a finite sum of weights of implications in T .
Proof. Let LAE' be the calculus obtained modifying LAE in the following way: rule (R3) is dropped; and (R5) is replaced by
Assume that, for some s ∈ R + , there is a proof of ζ s → η from T in LAE. From this proof, we drop every application of (R3) and decrease the weights of the subsequent implications accordingly, such that a proof in LAE' is obtained.
Let ζ s → η be the proved implication. Then s s and s is the sum of finitely many reals each of which is the weights of some implication contained in T . This proof may in turn transformed to a proof of ζ s → in LAE. Indeed, we replace each application of (R5') by an application of (R3) followed by (R5).
We conclude that if ζ s → η is provable, then so is ζ s → η, where s is a sum of elements of a finite set of positive reals. The assertions follow.
In the context of a forest proof, we will use the following additional notions. For a non-terminal clause L, we say that a literal λ is introduced at L if L does not contain λ, but some child of L does. Conversely, if L contains λ but no child of L does so, we say that λ is dropped at L.
Furthermore, assume that the literal λ is contained in the non-terminal clause L and one of the following conditions holds:
1. Case (A) or (B) of condition (T4) applies at L. Moreover, with reference to the notation of Definition 3.5, λ is not among λ 1 , . . . , λ n . Finally, if λ is contained in the child of L indexed by i ∈ {1, . . . , l}, λ is one of µ i1 , . . . , µ im i .
2. Case (C) applies at L. Moreover, L\{λ} is still inconsistent.
3. Case (D) applies at L. Moreover, λ is not contained in any children of L.
Then we call λ unused in L.
Lemma 5.2. Let there be a forest proof of ζ r → η from T . Then there is a forest proof of ζ r → η from T such that there is no unused literal in any proper node.
Proof. Let the non-terminal clause L contain the unused literal λ. We remove λ from L. Then, evidently, condition (A), (B), (C), or (D), respectively, applies to the new node L\{λ} if this was the case before.
If L\{λ} is the root, we are done. Otherwise, let L be the father of L\{λ}. L still fulfils the requirements of (T4) except for the case that, in the original proof forest, case (D) is applied to L and λ is one of ϕ or ¬ϕ, where ϕ is the splitting variable. Then L has the child L\{λ} ⊆ L as well as a second child that contains the negation of λ. We remove the latter together with the subtree rooted at it; and we remove the node L\{λ} and connect its children directly to L . Evidently, the result is again a forest proof of ζ r → η from T .
We repeat the same procedure as long as it is applicable.
Note what it means that a forest proof does not have any unused variables. Namely, let L be a non-terminal clause in such a forest proof. In case (A), if L contains any literal λ in addition to λ 1 , . . . , λ n , then λ is also contained in a child, where λ is not among the respective literals µ i1 , . . . , µ ik i . In case (B), we have L = {λ 1 , . . . , λ n }. In case (C), L = {ϕ, ¬ϕ} for some variable ϕ. Finally, in case (D), each λ ∈ L is also contained in one of the two children of L.
By a standard clause set for a Boolean formula α, we mean a clause set B such that, for any variable ϕ, the following holds: if ϕ is contained in a clause of B, then ϕ occurs in α positively, and if ¬ϕ is contained in a clause of B, then ϕ occurs in α negatively. Proof. Let B ζ be a standard clause set for ζ. We construct a new forest proof as follows. Let L be a clause in B ζ . Then L is chosen as a root of the new proof. We apply to L (T4)(D) as many times as necessary such that eventually each leaf includes a root of the original proof. For each such leaf L , we connect to L all children of the corresponding root of the original proof, together with the subtrees rooted at them. Proceeding in the same way for each clause in B ζ , the requirement of the first part of the lemma are fulfilled.
Let B η be a standard clause set for η. Then we apply (T4)(D) at each leaf as many times as necessary such that each leaf L includes a clauseL in B η . Next we replace L with its subsetL. If, in the original forest, (T4)(D) applied to the father L of L and the splitting variable is now missing, we remove all descendants of L , and we apply the same procedure to L , which then becomes a leaf includingL. In this way, we successively fulfil also the second part.
Lemma 5.4. Let there be a forest proof of ζ r → η from T . Then there is a forest proof such that the following holds. Let L be a non-terminal clause to which case (D) of condition (T4) applies. Then the splitting variable ϕ does not occur in L.
We remove all descendants of L and we connect instead the children of L directly to L.
Proceeding in the same way in all applicable cases, we fulfil the requirements of the lemma.
Lemma 5.5. Let there be a forest proof of ζ r → η from T . Let ϕ be a variable that does not occur negatively in ζ or in η; and for any implication α d → β contained in T , ϕ does not occur negatively in α or β. Then there is a forest proof in which the literal ¬ϕ does not occur.
A similar statement holds with respect to positive occurrences of ϕ.
Proof. We will show the first part; for the second part we can argue similarly. Accordingly, assume that ϕ does not occur negatively in ζ or η, and for any element of T given in the form (3), assume that the literal ¬ϕ does not occur.
Applying successively Lemmas 3.8, 5.4, 5.3, and 5.2, we can assume the following additional properties of the forest proof under consideration: any inconsistent clause has the only child ; (T4)(D) is not used when the splitting variable is already present; ¬ϕ does not occur in any root or leaf; and no unused literal occurs.
Assume that ¬ϕ occurs in the forest proof. Let L be a clause at which ¬ϕ is introduced such that ¬ϕ is not introduced at any descendant of L. At L, only case (D) can apply; hence L has two children L 1 and L 2 such that ϕ ∈ L 1 and ¬ϕ ∈ L 2 . Let S be the subtree whose root is L 2 and that is maximal w.r.t. the property that its nodes are clauses containing ¬ϕ. At the non-terminal nodes of S, then only cases (A) or (D) can apply. Furthermore, at each leaf L of S, ¬ϕ is by assumption dropped. This means that case (C) is applied to L = {ϕ, ¬ϕ}.
We now modify the proof forest with the effect that ¬ϕ will no longer occur in any descendant of L. We remove the subtree rooted at L 1 ; and from each clause in S, we drop ¬ϕ and add the elements of L instead. The former node L 2 becomes L; we replace the two coinciding nodes by a single one. Moreover, each leaf L of S is now L ∪ {ϕ} and hence includes L 1 ; we remove its only child and connect the subtrees rooted at the (former) children of L 1 , if there are any.
Since each weight in the subtree S is 0, the length of the modified proof forest is at most the length of the original one; thus we obtain a proof forest of ζ r → η from T again. We proceed in the same way as long as the literal ¬ϕ is present.
It is the next lemma where we make use of the special properties of proof forests that we have shown to be assumable.
Lemma 5.6. Let T be a basic theory. Then there is a basic theory T including T with the following property:
(E1) Let α, β, γ be Boolean formulas built up from variables that occur in T . If T α d → β ∨ γ for some d ∈ R + , then there are Boolean formulas α β , α γ such that the following is provable from T :
(E2) Let ζ and η be Boolean formulas built up from variables that occur in
(E3) Every weight of an implication in T is a finite sum of weights of implications in T .
Proof. Let (α, β, γ) be a triple of Boolean formulas built up from variables occurring in T , such that α is the conjunction of literals. Assume that there is a d ∈ R + such that T α d → β ∨ γ. Assume furthermore that d is the smallest weight with this property; such a weight exists by Lemma 5.1 and is a sum of weights of implications contained in T . Assume finally that there are no two Boolean formulas α β , α γ such that all five implications (8) are provable from T . Note that then d > 0.
Let then α β and α γ be variables that are not among those occurring in T and add the five basic implications (8) to T . Let T arise from T by proceeding for each such triple in the indicated way, in each case using two new variables.
Then, by construction, T fulfils (E1) restricted to conjunctions of literals α and minimal weights d. We readily check that T actually fulfils (E1) in general. It is furthermore clear that T fulfils also (E3).
To see that T fulfils (E2), let ζ and η contain only variables present in T , and assume that T ζ r → η. By Theorem 3.9, there is a forest proof of ζ r → η from T .
Let (α, β, γ) be one of the triples that gave rise to an extension of T ; let α be the conjunction of the literals λ α 1 , . . . , λ α n , n 1. That is, T contains the implications (8) and the variables α β and α γ occur exactly in these five implications. Assume that at least one of these variables occurs in the forest proof. We shall show that we can eliminate α β and α γ . We can proceed in the same way for every pair of newly added variables and (E2) will follow. By Lemma 5.5, we can assume that the proof forest does not contain the literals ¬α β and ¬α γ . By Lemma 5.3, we can furthermore assume that the variables α β and α γ do not occur in the roots and leaves. By Lemma 5.2, we may finally assume that there is no unused literal.
Let L be a clause at which α β or α γ is introduced. Then case (A) of condition (T4) applies to L and α 0 → α β ∨ α γ is the used implication. In particular, L ⊇ {λ α 1 , . . . , λ α n } and we can assume that L has exactly two children: the child L 1 consisting of α β and a subset of L, as well as the child L 2 consisting of α γ and a subset of L. Let S 1 be the subtree whose root is L 1 and that is maximal w.r.t. the property that each node is proper and contains α β . Similarly, let S 2 be the subtree S 2 whose root is L 2 and that is maximal w.r.t. the property that each node is proper and contains α γ . Note that all weights in S 1 and S 2 are 0. Moreover, at each leaf of S 1 , α β is dropped on the basis of α β 0 → α or α β d → β; similarly for S 2 . We modify the proof forest as follows.
Case 1: At all leaves of S 1 , case (A) is applied on the basis of α β 0 → α. Then we remove the subtree rooted at L 2 . Furthermore, in each node of S 1 , we replace α β by λ α 1 , . . . , λ α n . As a consequence, some nodes L have a child L ⊆ L ; this is the case where, in the original proof forest, case (A) applies on the basis of α 0 → α β ∨ α γ or α β 0 → α. We then remove the descendants of L and connect the children of L directly to L . applies to L, the used implication being α (F3) Every weight of an implication inT is a finite sum of weights of implications in T .
Proof. We put T 0 = T , and for each i 0, we let T i+1 = T i , the extension of T i according to Lemma 5.6. We putT = i T i .
Let Φ be an implication containing only variables occurring inT . IfT Φ, there is an i such that Φ contains only variables occurring in T i and T i proves Φ. Thus The extension of a basic theory specified by Lemma 5.7 is easily seen to fulfil Lemma 5.1 as well.
Lemma 5.8. Let T be a finite theory and letT be the extension of T according to Lemma 5.7. Let ζ, η be Boolean formulas such thatT ζ s → η for some s ∈ R + . Then there is an r ∈ R + with the following properties: (i) r is the smallest value such thatT ζ r → η and (ii) r is a finite sum of weights of implications in T .
Proof. By condition (F3) of Lemma 5.7, each weight of an implication contained inT is a sum of weights of implications contained in the finite theory T . Hence we can argue as in the proof of Lemma 5.1.
We finally arrive at our main result.
Theorem 5.9. Let T be a finite theory and Φ an implication. Then T proves Φ in LAE if and only if T semantically entails Φ in LAE q .
Proof. The "only if" part holds by Proposition 3.2.
To see the "if" part, assume that T does not prove the implication ζ r → η. LetT the extension of T according to Lemma 5.7. By (F2), then alsoT does not prove ζ r → η.
For Boolean formulas α and β built up from variables occurring inT , we put now α β ifT α 0 → β, and we put α ≈ β if α β and β α. Then ≈ is an equivalence relation inducing a Boolean algebra B. Note that B is separable because the number of variables is countable.
that, given any u > 0, the image of p contains only finitely many values smaller than u. The image of the quasimetric q, defined by (5) and (6), is consequently contained in the image of p; hence q has the same property. We conclude that Theorem 5.9 still holds if we modify the definition of LAE q restricting the models to min-spaces.
Conclusion
The logic of approximate entailment, which goes back to E. Ruspini [Rus] , is based on an idea that is as simple as convincing. The aim is to make precise what it means for a property α to imply another property β approximately. Assume that α and β correspond to subsets A and B, respectively, of a set of worlds W . Following [Rus] , all what we need to add is a distance function on W , that is, a map d assigning a value to pairs of worlds that reasonably measures their distinctness. Then α is considered to imply β to the degree of imprecision d if A is a subset of the d-neighbourhood of B.
To associate with this idea a logic on semantic grounds is straightforward; to axiomatise this logic, however, turns out to be difficult. Those few sound rules that are listed in Definition 3.1 are easily found; to continue on this basis is a challenge. Our question has been if this small set of rules is not already sufficient to axiomatise a logic of the mentioned kind. We have given an affirmative answer for the case where the models are quasimetric spaces.
We may certainly say that the road to this goal was stony. It was necessary to develop the basis of a proof theory for the proposed calculus and to prove quite an amount of auxiliary lemmas. Future efforts in this area might well aim at different techniques, so that the proof of our completeness theorem could be shortened.
The present work gives rise to a considerable amount of open problems. First to mention, our completeness theorem covers finite theories; the case of infinite theories is open. We note that we may hardly proceed along the same lines as we did here; our procedure heavily relies on the finiteness assumption.
Second, we have introduced in [EGRV] a counterpart to the logic considered here, called the Logic of Strong Entailment, or LSE for short. Whereas in LAE q implicational relationships holding only approximately are considered, LSE not only requires implications to hold exactly, but even to be invariant under quantified changes. We wonder if a proof calculus along the present lines could be found for LSE as well.
Another question might not lead to immediate results, but should be explored nonetheless. The models constructed in the present context are, from the point of view of applications, somewhat unnatural; the image of the distance function contains only finitely many values below any given m ∈ R + . We ask if there is a logic of approximate entailment that corresponds more closely to the common situation that the set of world is (a subset of) R n , endowed with the Euclidean metric.
Speaking about the Euclidean metric, we are finally led to the probably most significant open problem in the present context. What we have in mind is the symmetry of the distance function. Does our completeness theorem still hold if we restrict to metric spaces, that is, those spaces that are based on a symmetric quasimetric? We conjecture that the answer is positive. We guess that proof-theoretical methods, however, are not suitable to deal with this case. We propose to examine instead the question if quasimetric spaces can be suitably embedded in metric spaces, such that the quasimetric of the former corresponds to the Hausdorff quasimetric of the latter space. A result of this kind is contained in [Vit] ; unfortunately, the proposed representation seems not to be applicable in the present context and an independent approach needs to be found.
